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Abstract   We link a stochastic binary choice model of individual decisions to
participate in the marine sport fisheries in Cook Inlet, Alaska, with a simula-
tion-based sample enumeration procedure for aggregating estimates of
individual angler welfare and a regionally adjusted zip code-level input-output
model of regional economic activity. The result is a behaviorally based model
for predicting changes in angler welfare and regional economic activity occa-
sioned by changes in the demand for sportfishing that arise from changes in trip
costs or the expected number, size, or mix of species caught. The advantages of
this approach are that: changes in angler participation are determined by vari-
ables that are observable, predictable, or subject to management control;
participation reflects declining marginal utility, and substitution and comple-
mentary effects across trip attributes; estimates of changes in aggregate angler
welfare and changes in regional economic impacts are derived from changes in
individual participation probabilities.
Key words   Recreational demand, angler welfare, regional economic impacts.
JEL Classification Codes   Q22, Q26, R12, C25, C67.
Introduction
The marine sport fisheries of Lower and Central Cook Inlet, Alaska, support a large,
recreation-based economic sector that provides non-pecuniary benefits to partici-
pants and income and net revenues to residents and businesses of the Kenai
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Peninsula region. Although the primary focus of this analysis is the fishery for Pa-
cific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis), the region’s most important saltwater sports
fishery, the marine sport fisheries for chinook (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha) and
coho (O. kisutch) salmon are treated as potential substitutes and complements.
These fisheries are subject to intrinsic and fishery-induced variations in abundance
and are managed under overlapping and evolving combinations of state and federal
regulations and international agreements that affect the magnitude and allocation of
sustainable harvests across commercial, subsistence, and recreational fisheries.
Pacific halibut are managed under the aegis of the Halibut Convention of 1923,
an international treaty between the US and Canada. Under this agreement, the Inter-
national Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC) is responsible for establishing
area-specific limits on the total direct and incidental harvest of Pacific halibut. The
constant exploitation yield (CEY) management strategy used by the IPHC can be
motivated as a strategy that maximizes the expected sustainable yield of halibut. Au-
thority to apportion the CEY among competing commercial, sport, and subsistence
interests is delegated to the individual nations. Allocations of the halibut CEY off
Alaska are set by the US Secretary of Commerce based on recommendations of the
North Pacific Fishery Management Council (Council).
Several current and potential policy issues highlight the importance of modeling
changes in aggregate angler welfare and changes in regional economic impacts asso-
ciated with recreational fisheries. For example, the SS Glacier Bay and SS Exxon
Valdez oil spills occasioned a need for assessment of damages to commercial and
recreational fisheries (Northern Economics 1990; Cohen 1993). Similarly, leasing of
outer continental shelf minerals exploration and development rights requires an eco-
nomic impact analysis that describes the likelihood that an oil spill could occur and
how a spill would affect commercial and recreational catches, welfare, and regional
economic activity (Herrmann, Lee, Hamel, and Criddle 2001). Another example is
the allocation of catches between user groups. Historically, the Council has speci-
fied a commercial total allowable catch (TAC) for Pacific halibut as the regionally
apportioned CEY less a bycatch allowance and expected non-commercial (sport and
subsistence) catches. As the share of halibut caught by sport fishers has increased,
commercial fishers have lobbied the Council to take actions to limit erosion of the com-
mercial TAC. Growth of halibut sportfishing catches has been particularly pronounced
in the Central Gulf of Alaska Region (Prince William Sound, Resurrection Bay, Kodiak,
Yakutat, and especially Cook Inlet and adjacent portions of the Gulf of Alaska), where
landings have increased from less than 2% of the CEY in the late 1970s to over 18% of
the CEY before the end of the 1990s. During the same period, the number of Alaska
resident sportfishing licenses sold increased 41% (from about 122,000 to 172,000
per year) and nonresident license sales increased 480% (from about 56,000 to
269,000 per year). In response to the increasingly acrimonious allocation conflicts
between commercial and sport interests, the Council recently approved a guideline
harvest level (GHL)—a flexible cap for charterboat-based sportfishing catches of
halibut. The initial GHL was set equal to the 1995–99 average catch with provisions
for adjustments in response to changes in halibut biomass (NPFMC 2000). Under
the GHL, expected subsistence harvests and expected harvests by sport fishers who
do not hire charterboat services continue to be deducted from the CEY and thus
from the commercial TAC. If approved by the Secretary of Commerce, the GHL will
be implemented in 2003. The GHL is regarded as a stopgap measure because there is
little confidence that traditional sport fishery management measures can hold
catches to no more than the GHL. To address these concerns, the Council approved
the establishment of an individual fishing quota (IFQ) program for charter-based
sportfishing catches of halibut (NPFMC 2001). Under the IFQ program, voluntary
market transactions will allocate halibut within the charterboat sector and betweenParticipation, Welfare, and Impact of Sportfishing 293
commercial and charter operations. Subject to approval by the Secretary of Com-
merce, the charter IFQ program will replace the GHL. Cost-benefit analyses of these
policy alternatives require an understanding of how the alternatives would affect an-
gler participation rates, angler welfare, and regional economic activity.
There are two components to a comprehensive evaluation of the economics of
marine sportfishing: estimation of the net benefits that accrue to sport fishers and
assessment of the economic impact generated by marine sportfishing. We use a binary
choice model of individual participation decisions to derive estimates of angler welfare
and a regionally adjusted input-output model to estimate regional economic impacts.
The two most widely applied models for binary choice panel data are the fixed
effects model (Chamberlain 1982) and the random effects model (Butler and Moffitt
1982). The fixed effects model accounts for heterogeneity by allowing individual-
specific parametric shifts in the response function; thus it is appropriate for
forecasting responses for those particular individuals. In contrast, the random effects
model assumes that each individual’s responses are correlated. Consequently, the ran-
dom effects framework is more appropriate when the data are a random sample of
individuals from a larger population of interest (Maddala 1987; Greene 1997). More-
over, the random effects model allows inclusion of variables that do not vary across trips
(e.g., socioeconomic variables), while the fixed effect model does not. A Monte Carlo
experiment by Guilkey and Murphy (1993) has shown that use of the standard binomial
probit model in cases where there is a random effect can bias the estimates of the param-
eters’ standard errors. We use a random effects probit model of individual participation
decisions and a Monte Carlo-based aggregation procedure to estimate changes in angler
welfare conditioned on changes in sportfishing trip attributes. Many marine sport fishers
contract with private charter operators for guide services. However, because the
number of charter service providers is large and the barriers to entry are small, we
assume that the charter sector can be characterized as perfectly competitive; thus
charter operators earn normal profits. The economic impact of expenditures by an-
glers and charter operators is represented in a regional input-output model of the
Kenai Peninsula region. We use a simulation model that links the participation rate,
angler welfare, and regional economic impact models to estimate the changes in re-
gional economic activity occasioned by environmental or regulatory changes.
Development of our model and presentation of the results is organized in three
sections. We begin with a description of the data used to estimate model coeffi-
cients. In the second section, we describe the model framework and baseline
parameter estimates. The third section integrates the participation-rate, angler wel-
fare, and regional impact models in a set of simulations for various halibut catch
levels and trip costs.
Description of Data
Three data sources were used to support our analyses: voluntary responses to two
postal surveys and onsite interviews with Kenai Peninsula region local government
officials and business community members.
UAF Angler Survey
The University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF) angler survey (Lee et al. 1998;
Herrmann, Lee, Criddle, and Hamel 2001) was developed and administered follow-
ing Dillman’s Total Design Method (Dillman 1978). An initial draft of the survey
was administered to a small sample of anglers intercepted in the cities of Homer andCriddle, Herrmann, Lee, and Hamel 294
Seward, Alaska. Respondent comments were used to guide the development of a re-
vised draft survey which was pre-tested using verbal protocol analysis (Ericsson and
Simon 1993)—one-on-one interviews of randomly selected potential survey recipi-
ents from Fairbanks and Anchorage. These interviews provided an opportunity to
study angler attitudes and vocabulary, their decision-making processes, and their
ability to answer the survey questions. Information from all pre-testing stages was
used to improve the content and clarity of the survey instrument, questions, format,
cover design, and cover letters. The survey was mailed to 4,000 anglers randomly
drawn from a list of individuals who purchased an Alaskan sportfishing license in
1997. The initial survey mailing was followed by a reminder card. Non-respondents
were sent a second copy of the survey 14 days after the initial survey mailing. The
first two survey mailings and the reminder card were sent by first class mail. A third
survey was sent by certified mail to those who did not respond within 14 days after
the second survey mailing. All survey mailings included a cover letter motivating
the survey and a prize entry card to increase the response rate. Survey recipients
were informed that by returning the prize entry card, they would be entered into a
drawing for their choice of either a one-day halibut sportfishing trip aboard a charter
vessel based in Homer, Alaska, or $150. The cover letter noted that three prizes
would be awarded based on a random drawing from the entry cards returned.1 The
overall response rate was 70.1% on the 3,767 delivered surveys. Of the 2,641 re-
spondents, 352 took at least one salmon or halibut sportfishing trip in marine waters
off the Kenai Peninsula during 1997.
Responses to the UAF angler survey provided baseline demographic informa-
tion (household after tax income, household size, and respondent gender, age, and
education level), information about expenditures incurred and attributes of recent
sportfishing trips taken in Lower or Central Cook Inlet, and angler preferences re-
garding hypothetical trips. Information on expenditures included transportation
(e.g., vehicle rental fees, vehicle fuel expenditures, and airfare), food and lodging
(e.g. grocery purchases, restaurant and bar expenses, hotel/motel room rentals, vaca-
tion rentals, campground fees, other lodging), and fishing expenditures (e.g., guide
and charter fees and tips, fishing gear purchased specifically for the trip, fish pro-
cessing and packaging fees, fishing derby entry fees, boat fuel and lubricants, and
moorage and haulout fees). Survey responses were used to develop the individual-
level participation rate model and to parameterize a regional economic model.
Nonresidents spent an average of $294.21 per charter-based sportfishing day:
$103.87 in transportation and living expenses and $190.34 in fishing expenses. Non-
resident fishing expenditures were dominated by charter fees ($140.75) and fish
handling/processing charges ($32.72). Alaska residents from outside the Kenai Pen-
insula Borough spent an average of $204.91 per charter-based sportfishing day.
Locals (Kenai Peninsula Borough residents) averaged $167.47 in fishing expendi-
tures per day of charter-based fishing. The average cost-per-day for charter-based
sportfishing trips was 64% higher than the average for trips taken on private vessels.
Overall angling effort was distributed: 40% charter; 46% private vessel; and 14%
from shore. While charter-based effort accounted for only 25% of the angling effort
by Alaskans, it accounted for 59% of the angling effort by nonresidents. When ag-
gregated across charter vessel, private vessel, and shore-based fishing modes, the
average saltwater fishing trip yielded catches of 1.71 halibut for Alaskans and 2.43
halibut for nonresidents. Anglers who participated in dedicated halibut charters av-
eraged catches of 3.51 fish per angler-day. Most survey respondents who took a
saltwater sport fishing trip to the Cook Inlet region during 1997 took only one trip.
1 All three prize winners selected the cash award.Participation, Welfare, and Impact of Sportfishing 295
ADF&F Angler Survey
The annual Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G) angler survey was sent
to 22,000 individuals in 1997 and yielded a response rate of 45.8% on delivered sur-
veys after three mailings (Howe et al. 1998). Sportfishing effort in Lower and
Central Cook Inlet during 1997 was estimated to total 197,556 angler-days. Partici-
pation by nonresidents accounted for 44% of total days fished (86,970 angler-days).
In the more expensive charter fishery, nonresidents comprised 65% of the total char-
ter effort, while comprising just 28% and 37% of the private vessel and shoreline
fishing days, respectively. A Monte Carlo simulation procedure was used to combine
the participation rate model and effort estimates from the ADF&G survey to form
estimates of total angler participation and net benefits.
Onsite Interviews
Responses to the UAF angler survey were combined with State and Borough em-
ployment and earnings data and information gathered through onsite interviews with
local government officials and business leaders. It was then used to update and
groundtruth the technical coefficients of a regional input-output model of the Kenai
Peninsula economy and to disaggregate the sportfishing sector (Herrmann, Lee,
Hamel, and Criddle 2001; Herrmann, Lee, Criddle, and Hamel 2001).
Because marine sportfishing was not the sole or primary motivation for trips
taken by some survey respondents, it would have been inappropriate to attribute all
of the trip expenses to the existence of marine sportfishing opportunities.2 Expendi-
ture estimates were, therefore, adjusted downwards using data on trip purpose from
the survey (see Herrmann, Lee, Criddle, and Hamel 2001). The total spending directly
attributable to the fishing component of trips taken in 1997 (i.e., money that would not
have been spent if the fishing component were cancelled) was estimated at $34.1 mil-
lion, $28.5 million of which was spent on the Kenai. Because we assumed that local
residents would substitute spending on other regional recreational activities (e.g.,
freshwater sportfishing or marine sportfishing in Prince William Sound) for fore-
gone marine sportfishing expenditures, their expenditures ($3.5 million) were also
deducted. The $25.0 million remainder reflects an estimate of the infusion of spend-
ing on the Kenai Peninsula that would not have occurred in the absence of marine
sportfishing opportunities in Lower and Central Cook Inlet (table 1). The adjusted
1997 expenditure data were used as a baseline in the regional economic model.
Model Framework and Baseline Estimates
Individual Participation Decisions
Changes in trip costs, expected catch rates, fishery regulations, and environmental
quality affect the expected net benefit associated with sportfishing, and therefore the
decision to participate in (take) a sportfishing trip. Previous studies (e.g., Holland
and Ditton 1992, Aas 1995, Thunberg et al. 1999) have used variation in demo-
2 While the unadjusted values may be a better predictor of the level of expenditures attributable to the
mix of participants in the fishery in a typical year, only expenditures by those whose trip destination
decision was influenced by the existence of marine fishing opportunities can be viewed as being contin-
gent on the existence and attributes of the marine sport fisheries.Criddle, Herrmann, Lee, and Hamel 296
graphic characteristics to explain changes in the demand for recreational fishing.
While such models may provide useful descriptions of past participation decisions,
they are not useful for predicting future participation rates because the resulting
forecasts are conditional on uncertain conjectures about demographic change. That
is, such models shift the focus from forecasting changes in participation to predict-
ing demographic change and are not suitable for predicting changes in the demand
for recreational fishing that might arise in response to changes in trip costs, fishing
conditions, or management actions. Our approach avoids these problems by focusing
on explanatory variables that are predictable or subject to management control. For
example, total catch levels are a management choice subject to population dynamics
that are well characterized for halibut and conditionally predictable for salmon. In
addition to being constrained by overall catch limits, catch levels are subject to
management actions related to season length, bag, possession, and catch-and-release
regulations. Similarly, charter trip costs are subject to management influence
through the erection of barriers to entry (license limitation) and the direct effect of
permit and license prices. Consequently, our model is better suited for policy evalu-
ation and forecasting participation rate responses to changes in trip costs and catch
rates.
In the UAF survey, respondents were presented a set of hypothetical fishing
trips and asked to identify which trips they would take. Each hypothetical trip was
described in terms of one of three cost levels ($100, $170, or $240 per day), one of
four halibut keep and release levels (0, 2, 4, or 6 fish per trip), one of four average
halibut weights (0, 20, 40, or 80 lbs. per fish), one of three chinook catch levels (0,
1, or 2 fish per trip), one of four average chinook weights (0, 15, 25, or 50 lbs. per
fish), one of four coho catch levels (0, 2, 4, or 6 fish per trip), and one of two aver-
age coho weights (0 or 7 lbs. per fish). Attributes of the hypothetical trips were
derived from historical mean catch and average weight data and pretest discussions
with recreational fishers. The cost per day was identified as the sum of sportfishing
related costs, such as tackle and bait purchased specifically for the trip, charter/
guide fees, and trip specific transportation costs such as auto and boat fuel. For con-
sistency, average catch (weight) was set to zero whenever average weight (catch)
Table 1
Kenai Peninsula Area Expenditures by Alaskans (Non-local) and
Nonresidents that can be Directly Attributed to Lower and
Central Cook Inlet Halibut or Salmon Sportfishing Trips
Expenditures ($ million)
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was zero. In order to estimate an indirect utility function that includes the main ef-
fects and all relevant two-way interactions, 27 trips were selected and assigned to
nine distinct three-trip blocks. The 27 trips and their nine blocks were simulta-
neously selected based on a criterion that maximized the determinant of the
information matrix. The resulting parsimonious experimental design allows for the
efficient identification of substitution and complementary effects across attributes,
and for the possibility of nonlinear marginal utility. While these types of effects are
predicted in economic theory, they are seldom identified in empirical studies of ac-
tual trips because attributes are often highly collinear or lack sufficient variation.
Each of the 4,000 survey recipients was randomly assigned one of the nine blocks of
three hypothetical trips.
The participation decision was modeled as a nonlinear random utility function.
The utility that individual i derives from trip t is given by:
uit = f (xit, zi, b, g) + eit,
where the vector, xit, describes the attributes of the t-th trip taken by the i-th indi-
vidual; socioeconomic and demographic variables for each individual are included
in the vector zi; b and g are vectors of parameters associated with the fishing trip
attributes and socioeconomic variables, respectively; and the errors, eit, are normally
distributed with an expected value of zero.
Respondents were asked whether they would take a trip, described by attributes
xit. Those who would take the trip obtain a utility level of uit. Those who would not
take the trip receive:
ui0 = f(0, zi, b, g) + ei0 ,
the utility level associated with not taking the trip, which is also the opportunity cost
of taking the trip. Since the actual levels of utility are unobservable, the model is
made operational by specifying a binary indicator y* that denotes which choice was
made; that is,  y it
* = 1 if the respondent would take trip and  y it
* = 0 otherwise. As-
suming that individuals make rational choices,  y it
* = 1 implies that the expected
utility of taking the trip is greater than the expected utility of not taking the trip; that
is, E(uit ³ ui0). Conversely,  y it
* = 0 implies that E(uit < ui0).
We specified the random utility model as:
y it
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where the binary variable  y it
* was assigned a value of 1 when survey respondent i
indicated a willingness to take trip t, and 0 otherwise. The variables Pt,  nt
s, and  wt
s
are hypothetical attributes that denote the cost-per-day of taking trip t and the num-
ber and total weight (a product of the number of fish caught and average weight per
fish) of species s caught on trip t, where halibut, chinook, and coho are denoted by
the superscripts h, ch, and co, respectively. The variables sexi, agei, and edui are the
gender, age, and education level reported by individual i. The superscript T is used
to denote matrix transposition.
The data and coefficient matrices are partitioned to emphasize components re-
sponsible for linear and quadratic factors and to highlight the exclusion restrictions.
Because the plausible catches for chinook were 0, 1, or 2 fish, the data lacked suffi-
cient variation to estimate the linear, quadratic, and interaction terms that we
considered to be important. The weight variable was not subject to this limitation
because the hypothetical trips included total catch weights of 0, 15, 25, 30, 50, and 100
lbs. of chinook, enough variability to support the estimation of all of the linear and non-
linear direct and interaction terms of interest. Although we had ample variation in coho
catches (0, 2, 4, 6), the invariance in coho weight (7 lbs. per fish for all hypothetical
trips where coho were caught) would have caused the information matrix to be singular
if we had included data representing both the weight and number of coho caught. We
chose to exclude coho numbers in order to be able to estimate an interaction between
coho and chinook, an interaction that focus groups suggested could be important. That
is, because we lacked sufficient variation to specify a full set of interactions in B
and L, we chose a full specification for B and a restricted specification for L.
The coefficient matrices a,  B,  L, and G, and a random effects parameter, r,
were estimated simultaneously for resident and nonresident respondents using a ran-
dom effects probit procedure. To ensure that the participation decisions were grounded
in recent experience, coefficient estimation was based on the 352 surveys returned by
respondents who took at least one salmon or halibut sportfishing trip in marine wa-
ters off the Kenai Peninsula during 1997. Each respondent answered questions
regarding three different hypothetical trips, yielding a total of 1,056 observations.
Coefficient estimates are reported in table 2. The random effect parameter, r, is
statistically different from zero at the 99% level, confirming the presence of a ran-
dom effect. The point estimates of the parameters accord well with economic theory:
the price coefficient is negative; the coefficients on total halibut, chinook salmon,
and coho salmon weights and halibut catches are positive; coefficients on the qua-
dratic terms and cross products are negative, implying that recreational fishers
experience decreasing marginal utility and that catches of each species are substi-
tutes for catches of the others; and the probability of taking a trip increases as a
function of income, age, and education, and is higher for males. With exception of
the coefficient on squared halibut weight in the nonresident equation and the coeffi-
cient on squared coho weight in the Alaskan resident equation, all coefficients on
price and linear, nonlinear, and cross-product terms for catch weight and numbers were
significantly different from zero at the 5% level (table 2). Resident gender and nonresi-
dent education level were the only socioeconomic variables found to be statistically
significant. Overall model performance was good: the log likelihood at convergence was
–542.503 and –731.047 when the parameters were set to zero, and R2 was 0.442.3
3 The log-likelihood at convergence is the value of the log-likelihood function evaluated at the parameter val-
ues we report. These are the parameter values that maximize the log-likelihood function and were found by







where LLm is the value of the log-likelihood function from the model, LL0 is the value of the log-likelihood
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Although changes in resource abundance that arise from stock dynamics or
changes in environmental conditions are not explicitly represented in the participa-
tion model, such changes affect the average weight and number of fish caught in the
sport fishery, trip attributes that are explicitly represented in our model. This linkage
is implicit in ADF&G’s escapement-based management strategy for salmon and is
explicit in the CEY management strategy for halibut. Although the management
agencies (ADF&G for salmon and NPFMC for halibut) are not required to distribute
changes in the salmon guideline harvest level or halibut CEY proportionally among
commercial, sport, and other fisheries, the history of management actions in the
salmon fishery is consistent with this assumption. In addition, subject to approval of
the Secretary of Commerce, recent Council action (NPFMC 2001) explicitly speci-
fies a proportionality principle for accommodation of changes in the halibut CEY.
Total Demand and Angler Welfare
The conditional individual participation probabilities were aggregated into estimates
of total demand using a simulation-based sample enumeration method that takes into
account differences in demographic characteristics and variability in the number of
days fished per year. The sample enumeration method, described in BenAkiva and
Lerman (1985), takes into account differences in socioeconomic characteristics and
variability in the number of days fished per year by developing forecasts for each
individual in the sample. We use this information to weight the simulations by the
Table 2
Random Effects Probit Model Parameter Estimates
Alaskans (local and non-local) Nonresidents
Estimates t-ratios Estimates t-ratios
Intercept –2.7965 –3.01 –1.4818 –1.94
Price –0.0124 –7.59 * –0.0094 –6.98 *
Total weight of halibut 0.0373 3.28* 0.0229 2.54*
Total weight of chinook 0.1038 4.35* 0.0734 3.62*
Total weight of coho 0.1263 3.02* 0.1165 3.20*
Squared halibut weight –0.0001 –2.91 * –0.0001 –1.34
Squared chinook weight –0.0006 –3.44 * –0.0004 –2.59 *
Squared coho weight –0.0008 –1.18 –0.0011 –1.82 *
Product of total weight of
halibut and coho caught –0.0005 –3.55 * –0.0004 –3.22 *
Product of total weight of
halibut and chinook caught –0.0007 –2.92 * –0.0005 –2.41 *
Product of total weight of
chinook and coho caught –0.0018 –3.62 * –0.0010 –2.30 *
Number of halibut caught 1.1228 2.11* 0.9263 2.36*
Squared number of halibut caught –0.1513 –2.25 * –0.1300 –2.56 *
Gender (1=male) 0.4048 2.17* 0.0970 0.59
Age 0.0103 1.44 0.0003 0.05
Education (1=college graduate) 0.3394 1.79 0.3839 2.50*
r 0.1942 2.82* 0.1942 2.82*
* Significantly greater (less) than zero at p £ 0.05 for one-sided tests on all variables except the socio-
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number of days fished. The simulation provides separate results for Alaskan resi-
dents and nonresidents. The general formula for all forecasts is:
%DY =
F(ˆ  u  i,1)daysi
i=1
n









where %DY is the percentage change in total participation occasioned by a change
in trip attributes. The indirect utility that individual i derives from a trip with
baseline attributes is denoted  ˆ  u  i,0 . In contrast,  ˆ  u  i,1 denotes the indirect utility ob-
tained from a fishing trip with attribute levels that reflect an a percent change from
the baseline levels. The number of days fished by individual i in marine waters off
the Kenai Peninsula during 1997 is represented by daysi. The notation F(·) repre-
sents the cumulative normal distribution function. Because point estimates of
percentage changes in the number of angler-days are highly nonlinear, confidence
intervals were based on 10,000 draws of a Monte Carlo procedure described in
Krinsky and Robb (1986).
Following Hanemann (1999), conditional estimates of angler welfare were cal-
culated from the estimated participation rate model as the product of the weighted
average compensating variation4 per trip taken and the total number of angler-days
spent fishing for salmon and halibut in Lower or Central Cook Inlet. The expected
maximum utility that individual i derives from trip j can be represented by Mi,j =
E[max (ui,1,  ui,0)], where ui,1 = vi,1 + ei,1 denotes the utility received from taking a
fishing trip and ui,0 = vi,0 + ei,0 denotes the utility received from not taking a fishing
trip. The economic welfare associated with the choice is cvi,j = –Mi,j/pp, where cvi,j is
the compensating variation that individual i derives from trip j with corresponding
attributes, and pp is the marginal utility of income and is equal to the coefficient es-
timate on the price (cost of trip) variable. Since the marginal utility of income is
held constant in our model, this welfare measure is also the equivalent variation
welfare measure.
The value of Mi,j can be calculated from the probability density function:












where f(·) is the bivariate normal probability density function. If the utility of not
taking a trip is normalized such that ui,0 = 0, then a trip will only be taken when
vi,1 + ei,1 ³ 0, and M simplifies to:
M = (vi,1 + ei,1)f(ei,1)¶ei,1
-v1
+¥
ò = vi,1F(vi,1) + f(vi,1).
4 Compensating variation is a measure of net benefit to consumers. It can be motivated as an additional
cost that, if added to the cost of a particular sportfishing trip, would leave the sport fisher indifferent
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The estimated weighted average compensating variation across all individuals




















where daysij is the number of angler days fished by angler i during 1997 in the
Lower and Central Cook Inlet salmon and halibut sport fisheries (Howe et al. 1998).
The estimated total compensating variation for trip j with corresponding at-
tributes is:
CV j = cv ^
j Daysj 1 + %DY ( ), (4)
where Days j is the total number of angler-days fished for salmon and halibut in
Lower or Central Cook Inlet by all individuals, and %DY is the change in participa-
tion relative to the baseline 1997 season.
Changes in compensating variations will then be calculated as:
DCV = CV j - CVk, (5)
where CVj is the compensating variation associated with trips with attributes j, and
CVk is the compensating variation associated with trips with attributes k.
The estimated average daily compensating variation for fishing trips in 1997
was $82.51 for Alaskans and $118.88 for nonresidents (table 3). The corresponding
estimate of total compensating variation was $19.46 million ($10.34 million for
nonresidents and $9.12 million for residents). Every change that affects sportfishing
trip attributes affects the average sport fisher’s decision to participate, regardless of
whether the attribute change is due to changes in the cost of a sportfishing trip, natu-
ral population fluctuations, regulatory change, or environmental damage. Changes in
the probability of individual participation lead to shifts in the total demand for




CV per Day ($) ($ million)
Residency 90% Lower 90% Upper
Category Angler Days Mean Bound Bound Mean
Local 48,877 82.51 47.44 123.89 4.032
Alaskan 61,709 82.51 47.44 123.89 5.091
Nonresident 86,970 118.88 85.20 155.95 10.339
Total 197,556 19.463Criddle, Herrmann, Lee, and Hamel 302
Regional Impact Analysis
Marine sportfishing can take place from shore, private or rented boats, or charter
boats. The expenditures associated with each of these choices contribute to regional
economic activity; thus changes in participation that arise from changes in trip at-
tributes affect regional economic activity. Impact analysis focuses on the direct,
indirect, and induced effects that changes in expenditures have on output (produc-
tion), income, and employment. Direct effects are changes associated with
immediate changes in final demand. Indirect effects are changes associated with
changes in the demand for inputs to the production process. Induced effects result
from changes in household spending patterns that arise from changes in household
income as a consequence of the direct and indirect effects.
The Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation and Management Act (US De-
partment of Commerce 1996) places importance on both efficiency and equity issues
when managing the nation’s fisheries. While economic efficiency (i.e., consumer
surplus for anglers and producer surplus for charter operators) is a standard objec-
tive identified by economists, recent litigation involving fisheries has stressed
distributional issues in addition to efficiency considerations (e.g., Northern Econom-
ics 1990; Marine Advisory Program 1992; Cohen 1993). Economic impact analysis
provides a snapshot of the economic interdependencies of various industries in a re-
gional economy, and therefore allows analysts to model the downstream effects of
demand changes for commodities or services. Because opportunity costs and will-
ingness to pay do not enter into the impact assessment framework, the results of an
economic impact analysis should not be confused with statements of value. It should
be noted, however, that the results that yield the greatest value under a net benefit
analysis could imply very disproportional allocations among stakeholders. Although
notions of fairness and equity do not enter into the standard net benefits framework,
economic impact analyses are useful tools for tracking and identifying impacts of al-
ternative policies on revenue, income, and employment. For a more detailed
discussion on the differences and appropriate uses of cost-benefit and economic im-
pact analyses in fisheries, see for example, Edwards (1994) or Steinback (1999).
Development of the regional economic model is detailed in Herrmann, Lee,
Hamel, and Criddle (2001) and Hamel et al. (2002); a brief summary is included
here for convenience of the reader. We used IMPLAN (Olson and Lindall 1997) as
the foundation of a zip-code level economic model of the Kenai Peninsula. Although
the technical coefficients used by IMPLAN are regularly updated, regions such as
Alaska, where the small numbers of firms creates disclosure problems, and where
the economy is rapidly evolving, are not well characterized by the technical coeffi-
cients included in the IMPLAN database. To address this problem, we used State
and Borough employment and earnings data, information reported in NPFMC
(2000), and information gathered during two weeks of onsite interviews with local
government officials and business leaders in Kenai Peninsula Borough communities.
Individuals interviewed and specific changes to the IMPLAN technical coefficients
are identified in Herrmann, Lee, Hamel, and Criddle (2001).
Although IMPLAN represents 528 economic sectors, sectors that are regionally
important but small relative to other sectors in the national economy are often sub-
sumed in general categories. For example, IMPLAN’s amusement and recreation
sector includes sportfishing and 105 other types of recreation. In order to highlight
the regional economic impacts of changes in sportfishing participation levels, it was
necessary to disaggregate marine sportfishing from the amusement and recreation
sector. We followed a disaggregation procedure for the sportfishing sector suggested
in Steinback (1999), which involved constructing additional sectors within theParticipation, Welfare, and Impact of Sportfishing 303
IMPLAN framework and reprogramming the corresponding social accounting matri-
ces to reflect the characteristics of the disaggregated subsector. This choice was
driven by our interest in examining changes in final demand that might arise from
incremental changes in predictable or controllable trip attributes. If we had wanted
to measure the effects of a complete shutdown of the charter fishery to simulate, for
example the result of a catastrophic oil spill, the supply side approach used in Leung
and Pooley (2001) might have been more appropriate. However, because forward
linkages from the charter sector to other industry sectors on the Kenai Peninsula are
negligible (the guided sport fishery is fueled almost exclusively by angler demand),
and given an absence of intra-sectoral sales, multipliers derived from a hypothetical
extraction method would not have likely affected impacts of a significantly greater
scale than those from a traditional demand shock. For a detailed accounting of the
individual expense categories, corresponding Standard Industrial Classification
codes and translation to the IMPLAN sectoral scheme, the reader is referred to
Herrmann, Lee, Hamel, and Criddle (2001).
Individual sportfishing activities are accommodated differently from direct
income-generating  activities,  such  as  guiding.  We  account  for  individual
sportfishing activities by identifying their expenditure patterns in retail and service
sectors; that is, by treating visiting anglers as “cost centers” for various goods and
services rather than as an identifiable economic sector (Jensen Consulting 1997). We
allocate recreational expenditures among these sectors, using angler expenditure
data gleaned from the UAF angler survey (Herrmann, Lee, Criddle, and Hamel
2001). Finally, impact scenarios were run in IMPLAN to generate corresponding
response coefficients for each of the retail service sectors frequented by anglers.
These response coefficients and those developed for the charter sector were linked
in a stand-alone recreational module (Hamel et al. 2001).
Simulation Results and Analysis
The simulation model integrates the participation-rate, angler welfare, and regional
economic impact models and can be used to explore the effects of changes in trip
costs and expected catches on angler-days fished, angler welfare, and regional eco-
nomic  activity.5 The  model  was  developed,  in  part,  to  meet  the  needs  of
environmental and regulatory impact analyses related to outer continental shelf min-
erals exploration, development, and production activities in the Cook Inlet Planning
Area (Herrmann, Lee, Hamel, and Criddle 2001). However, preliminary model re-
sults have also been used in regulatory analyses related to recent management
actions designed to constrain the expansion of charter-based sportfishing for halibut
(NPFMC 2000) and analyses related to the adoption of individual fishing quotas for
charter-based halibut catches (NPFMC 2001).
5 Due to space constraints, it is not possible to report all the details that went into the modeling and
simulation analysis. Because of this, we offer the reader the following products that can be obtained by
contacting the authors.
• The simulation program <$FISH.XLS> can be downloaded as a compressed file, extracted, and run
in Microsoft Excel.
• The manual to <$FISH.XLS> (Hamel et al. 2001) is available as an Adobe Acrobat (pdf) file.
• The final project report to Minerals Management Service-University of Alaska Coastal Marine In-
stitute (Herrmann, Lee, Hamel, and Criddle 2001) is available as an Adobe Acrobat (pdf) file. This
file also includes the software manual to run $FISH.XLS.
• The survey data and methods are more fully explained in a final report to Alaska Sea Grant, Lee et
al. (1998), available as an Adobe Acrobat (pdf) file.Criddle, Herrmann, Lee, and Hamel 304
Changes in the probability that the average sport fisher will take a trip are cal-
culated using the parameters estimated from the probit model and aggregated into
predictions of changes in total sportfishing effort. They are then used to predict
changes in angler welfare and regional economic impacts. Figure 1 depicts changes
in the magnitude of sportfishing effort as a function of changes in the expected catch
of halibut.6 For example, a 30% reduction in expected catch-per-day is predicted to
lead to a 25.1% reduction in angler participation, while a 30% increase would be ex-
pected to increase total angler-days fished by 11.0%. Because the estimated
participation model is nonlinear and convex, successively larger increases in the ex-
pected catch of halibut lead to successively smaller incremental increases in the
number of angler-days fished. That is, changes in participation show a declining
marginal utility of catch and that Alaskans are more sensitive than nonresidents to
changes in expected catch.
Reductions (increases) in expected catch reduce (increase) the compensating
variation in two ways. First, the marginal sport fisher will drop out (enter) of the
fishery as the expected benefits (in terms of catch) decrease (increase), thereby de-
creasing (increasing) the total net benefits of the fishery. Second, the net benefit of
taking a trip is also reduced (increased) for all the sport fishers who continue to par-
ticipate because each trip produces less (more) net benefit when the catch rate
declines (increases). These changes are represented in figure 2. For example, a 30%
reduction in expected catch is predicted to lead to a 56.7% reduction in total com-
pensating variation. Conversely, changes in halibut abundance or management
6 Changes in fishery regulations or environmental changes that affect fishery biomass can be expected to
change the total weight of harvested fish through both fish numbers and average weight of the fish. In this
manuscript, we hold the average weight of fish constant and focus our analysis on changes to expected catch,
which is likely to be the dominant change to total weight from regulatory or environmental changes.
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policies that increase expected halibut catch-per-day by 30% could be expected to
increase angler net benefits by $5.8 million for residents and $3.6 million for non-
residents, a 48.4% increase in total angler welfare. Note that the total net benefits
that accrue to Alaskan anglers are more responsive to changes in expected catch
than are those obtained by nonresidents.
Unlike angler net benefits, which are a measure of economic efficiency, impact
analysis is a measure of distribution. That is, changes in average daily compensating
variation affect regional economic activity when they lead to changes in the total
number of sportfishing days. Furthermore, the net regional impact is limited to those
recreators who do not substitute other types of expenditures on the Kenai Peninsula
in lieu of expenditures that they would have made if they had gone fishing. Assess-
ment of the regional economic impacts of marine sportfishing on the Kenai
Peninsula Borough begins with a baseline of expenditures that fluctuates as sport
fisher behavior responds to changes in fishing conditions. Table 1 breaks out the $25
million of “new” money to the region spent by non-local Alaskans and nonresidents
($15.3 million of fishing related expenses and $9.7 million of other expenses).
Changes in expected angler success (catch) affect participation decisions and, conse-
quently, angler expenditures, industry output, personal income, and employment.
The magnitudes of these effects are reported in table 4. The results indicate, for ex-
ample, that for a 10% decrease in expected halibut catches, net benefits to resident
and nonresident sport fishers will decrease by $3.7 million (19.2%). The regional
impacts include a $2.0 million (7.1%) decrease in marine sport fishing related di-
rect, indirect, and induced output expenditures in the Kenai Peninsula region, which
will result in a decrease of $0.9 million (7.1%) in personal income and a loss of 59
jobs related to the marine sport fishery. For a 10% increase in expected halibut
catch-per-day, net benefits to sport fishers will increase by 18.1%, and there will be
a 5.3% increase in direct, indirect, and induced output expenditures in the Kenai
Figure 2.  The Effect of Changes in Expected Halibut Catch on the
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Peninsula region, which will result in a 5.3% increase in personal income and a
5.2% increase in related jobs. The marginal effect of each of these impacts is smaller
at higher catch levels and larger at lower catch levels, a consequence of the declin-
ing marginal value of catches and, therefore, participation.
Angler net benefits and regional economic impacts are also affected by changes
in trip costs (figures 3, 4). Trip costs might increase as a result of increased license
fees, as an unintended consequence of management actions taken to limit halibut
sportfishing catches, or other changes in the supply of or demand for trips. Figure 3
illustrates that the number of angler-days fished by Alaskans is more sensitive to trip
cost increases than is the number of angler-days fished by nonresidents. Conse-
quently, if fishery managers seek to limit sportfishing catches through an equal
Figure 3.  The Effect of Expected Fishing Trip Costs Changes on Angler Participation
Table 4
Changes in Compensating Variation (CV) and Regional
Economic Impacts in Response to Changes in Halibut Catch
Change in Change in Change in
% Change % Change in Change in Total Expenditures Personal Income Employment
in Catch Participation CV ($ million) ($ million) ($ million) (Jobs)
–50% –50.2% –16.4 –16.8 –7.1 –487
–40% –37.1% –14.1 –12.2 –5.1 –353
–30% –25.1% –11.0 –8.1 –3.4 –234
–20% –14.8% –7.5 –4.7 –2.0 –136
–10% –6.5% –3.8 –2.0 –0.9 –59
0%1 197,556 $19.5 $28.5 $12.0 822
+10% 4.9% 3.5 1.5 0.6 43
+20% 8.5% 6.7 2.6 1.1 75
+30% 11.0% 9.4 3.3 1.4 96
1 These values are baseline levels and provided to add a relative context to the absolute changes.Participation, Welfare, and Impact of Sportfishing 307
increase in resident and nonresident license fees, the percent reduction in trips taken
by Alaskans will be larger than the percent reduction in trips taken by nonresidents.
Alternatively, if managers wanted to achieve identical percent reductions in resident
and nonresident trips, they could impose a larger fee increase on nonresidents than
residents. Moreover, if managers were strictly concerned with benefits to Alaskan
resident anglers and concerned that the imposition of a binding GHL might lead to
increases in the cost of charter trips, they could select a nonresident license fee that
would induce a reduction in nonresident demand sufficient to choke off any upward
pressure on charter trip prices. It should be noted that such fees would need to be
based on the number of days fished or the number of fish caught. No such fees cur-
rently exist for halibut sportfishing in Alaska, and the authors do not necessarily
advocate the creation of such fees.
The regional economic impacts of changes in trip costs are reported in table 5.
Note that although participation is a linear function of trip cost, angler welfare and
regional economic activity are nonlinear. The results indicate, for example, that for a
$10 increase in expected trip costs, the number of angler-days fished will decline by
3.6%,  net  benefits  to sport  fishers will  decrease  by $2.2  million  (11.3%),
sportfishing related expenditures in the Kenai Peninsula region will fall by $1.1 mil-
lion (4%), Kenai Peninsula Borough personal income will decline by $0.5 million
(4%), and there will be a loss of 33 related jobs. Again, these effects are nonlinear,
with increasingly larger impacts at increasingly higher prices.
In the participation-rate model, when estimating changes in the probability that
individual fishers would take a trip, given varying trip attributes, it is assumed that
the price of the trip will remain constant at P. In other words, we assume that supply
is perfectly elastic. While this assumption is appropriate for shore and private trips,
it is probably not entirely accurate for the charter sector. To the extent that charter
trips make up a sizeable portion of sportfishing effort, and to the extent that charter
trips do not exhibit perfectly elastic supply curves, there may be price adjustment,
especially in the short run. For example, charter operators might respond to a short-
Figure 4.  The Effect of Expected Fishing Trip Costs Changes on the
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Table 5
Changes in Days Fished and Regional Economic Impacts in
Response to Increases in the Average Cost of a Sportfishing Trip
Change in % Change in Change in Change in Change in Change in
Average Angler-days Total CV Expenditures Personal Income Employment
Trip Cost Fished ($ million) ($ million) ($ million) (Jobs)
+$5 –1.8% –1.1 –0.6 –0.2 –16
+$10 –3.6% –2.2 –1.1 –0.5 –33
+$15 –5.6% –3.3 –1.8 –0.7 –51
+$25 –9.7% –5.3 –3.0 –1.3 –88
+$50 –21.3% –9.7 –6.7 –2.8 –193
01 197,556 $19,463,536 $28,524,174 $12,034,000 822
1 The values reported in the last row are baseline levels and provided to add a relative context to the
absolute changes.
run change in expected catches by lowering their prices and keeping their customer
base rather than holding prices constant and losing customers as assumed in our
model. While our assumption is valid in the long run, it may be somewhat unrealis-
tic in the short run. (If there is an upward sloping supply curve for charters, then
there would still be a loss in surplus associated with the charter industry when there
is an environmental change; however, some of the surplus would come from produc-
ers instead of consumers.) Additionally, if price were lowered to maintain the
current level of participation, there would be little regional impact outside of fish
processing. Therefore, for the charter industry, our results more closely reflect long-
run rather than short-run results, especially with respect to income distribution. For
shore and private vessels, this is not a factor.
Conclusions
This study develops estimates of the net economic benefits that accrue to partici-
pants in the Lower and Central Cook Inlet halibut sport fisheries, the relationship
between catch, size of catch, and the number of sportfishing days, and the regional
(Kenai Peninsula area) economic impact of changes in the annual total number of
person-days fished. The integrated model is used to explore changes in net benefits
and changes in regional impacts associated with changes in trip costs and angler
success. Changes in expected catch could result from predictable changes in stock
abundance; conditionally predictable environmental damages resulting from miner-
als exploration, development, production, or transportation activities; or from
controllable management actions that affect the allocation between commercial, sub-
sistence, and sport fishers, bag and possession limits, fishing methods, or other
measures that affect average catches. Changes in cost might arise as a result of pre-
dictable  shifts  in  the  demand  for  sportfishing;  as  the  result  of  deliberate
management actions such as changes in resident or nonresident license fees, stamps,
or endorsements; or incidental to management actions such as the GHL or charter
IFQ, which may affect the supply or character of sportfishing trips.
The advantages of our integrated model are that: changes in participation are
determined by variables that are observable, predictable, or subject to management
control; nonlinear preferences are easily accommodated; aggregation of the indi-
vidual participation probabilities provide a method for estimating angler welfare;Participation, Welfare, and Impact of Sportfishing 309
and estimated changes in aggregate participation can be linked to a regional input-
output model to provide estimates of the regional economic impacts of changes in
trip attributes. Although the model was developed, in part, to meet the needs of en-
vironmental and regulatory impact analyses related to outer continental shelf
minerals exploration, development, and production activities in the Cook Inlet Plan-
ning Area (Herrmann, Lee, Hamel, and Criddle 2001), preliminary model results
have also been used in regulatory analyses related to recent management actions de-
signed to constrain the uncompensated reallocation of halibut from the commercial
fishery to the charter-based sport fishery (NPFMC 2000, 2001).
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Appendix
There are many reasons for visiting Alaska and the Kenai Peninsula. Respondents to
the UAF angler survey (Herrmann, Lee, Criddle, and Hamel 2001) cited nine pri-
mary trip purposes. Table A1 summarizes the reasons given by respondents who
fished for halibut or salmon in Cook Inlet.
Table A1
Primary Purpose of Trip to Alaska
Alaskans
(non-local) Nonresidents
Saltwater fishing in Cook Inlet 87.9% 43.0%
Visit/vacation (in Alaska) in areas outside of Kenai Peninsula 2.9% 24.4%
Visit relatives 1.7% 12.0%
Freshwater fishing on Kenai Peninsula 5.2% 11.2%
Business trip 1.2% 3.7%
Combined marine/freshwater fishing 0.0% 2.5%
Visit friends 1.2% 0.4%
Cruise ship 1.2%
Hunting 1.7%
Because there is not an exact correspondence between visits to Alaska and the
desire to fish for halibut or salmon in Cook Inlet, it was necessary to adjust the total
expenditure estimates to reflect those regional expenditures that are uniquely attrib-
utable to fishing in the Cook Inlet. Consequently, after discussion with fishery
participants and representatives of related tourism and fishery sectors, we adopted a
set of assumptions regarding what respondents would do if the Cook Inlet
sportfishing portion of their trip were cancelled (table A2).
Table A2
Assumed Response of Respondents to Cancellation
of the Cook Inlet Sportfishing Portion of their Trip
Main Trip Purpose Alaskans (non-local) Nonresidents
Saltwater fishing in Cook Inlet Cancel entire trip to the Kenai Cancel entire trip to the Kenai
Visit/vacation (in Alaska) in areas Replace days on Kenai with Replace days on Kenai with
outside of Kenai Peninsula days elsewhere in Alaska days elsewhere in Alaska
Visit relatives Take full Kenai trip Take full Kenai trip
Freshwater fishing on Kenai Peninsula Reduce trip length by Reduce trip length by
lost fishing days lost fishing days
Business trip Take full Kenai trip Take full Kenai trip
Combined marine/freshwater fishing Reduce trip length by Reduce trip length by
lost fishing days lost fishing days
Visit friends Take full Kenai trip Take full Kenai trip
Cruise ship No observations Take full Kenai trip
Hunting No observations Take full Kenai tripCriddle, Herrmann, Lee, and Hamel 312
The total amount of effort from table A1 was combined with the assumptions of
what an individual would do of the fishing trip were cancelled, to form the overall
reduction in expenses associated with a reduction in Cook Inlet sportfishing effort
(table A3).
Table A3
Reduction in Fishing or Visitation Rates for a 100% Reduction in Fishing Effort (days)
Alaskans (non-local) Nonresidents
Fishing reduction 100% 100%
Kenai living expenses 89.5% 64.0%
For example, if a person does not take a fishing trip, we assumed that there
would be a 100% reduction of new money flowing into the Kenai Peninsula from
marine sportfishing-related expenditures (as the trip is not taken). However, there
still may be reason for the trip to be taken even if the individual does not fish. Our
calculations indicate that if an Alaskan (non-local) does not fish, 89.5% of the redis-
tribution of primary living expenditures from outside to inside the Kenai Peninsula
will not take place (note that 88% of the Alaskans took their Kenai Peninsula trip
primarily to engage in marine sportfishing). For nonresidents, we estimate that ap-
proximately 64.0% of the living and transportation expenditures taking place on the
Kenai Peninsula are a direct result of the fishing component of the saltwater fishing
trip (36% of these primary living expenditures would still take place, as there are
more reasons for non-residents to visit the Kenai Peninsula than for non-local Alas-
kans.
Although these are very broad assumptions, and other scenarios (such as substi-
tute  fishing  trips)  are  plausible,  we  believe  that  estimates based  on  these
assumptions are better than estimates that assume that all trip expenditures are de-
rived from the Cook Inlet halibut and salmon-fishing component. By reducing total
expenditures attributable to fishing, we represent a conservative view which is not
only more plausible, but also more defensible when valuing a fishery and calculat-
ing economic impacts of fishery changes to changes in expected fishing harvest.